



# Bounded oligarchy: How and when factions constrain leaders in party position-taking

Andrea Ceron\*

Dipartimento di Studi Sociali e Politici, Università degli Studi di Milano, Via Passione 13, 20122 Milano, Italy

## ARTICLE INFO

### Article history:

Received 3 August 2011

Received in revised form 1 July 2012

Accepted 6 July 2012

### Keywords:

Factions

Party position taking

Downs

Content analysis

Cartel party

Italy

## ABSTRACT

This work investigates the process of position-taking, focussing on the factional bargaining within the party. Exploiting two recently built datasets that estimated the policy positions of Italian parties and factions from 1946 to 2010, we investigate if and to what extent factions bind the party leader in choosing the platform. We find confirmation for the idea that party positions are linked to factional preferences. Overall, the party works as a 'bounded oligarchy'. Furthermore, the electoral payoff of party unity increases the impact of factional constraints when general elections approach. In line with the cartel party theory, however, autonomous leaders who are directly elected by a wider selectorate can get rid of factional ties choosing more moderate and vote-maximizing platforms.

© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

## 1. Introduction

Following the development of the spatial theory of voting (Downs, 1957), a large branch of literature started to address the question of how parties set their positions. In a two-party competition along a single dimension, Downs' theory predicts the well-known result of convergence towards the median voter. This result, however, relies on strict assumptions that hardly ever occur in real politics (e.g., Grofman, 2004). Relaxing some of these assumptions leads to a very different equilibrium, with parties moving away from the median voter's ideal point. For instance, in the presence of such phenomena as party identification, voter abstention, or mass parties bound by their activists, the centripetal convergence no longer holds.

Nonetheless, recent developments in the theory of voting provide new models that foresee a centrifugal equilibrium, and they seem to find empirical confirmation (e.g., Adams et al., 2005). In a multiparty system parties are

often bound by the preferences of their activists, factions, and members (Aldrich, 1983; Strøm, 1990; Ware, 1992). Therefore, to avoid loss of votes, they should diverge from the median voter in the direction of the rank-and-file. Vote-maximizing positions, however, tend to be more moderate when compared with those of party members.

The present paper addresses precisely the issue of how parties set their positions. Going beyond the assumption of the party as a unitary actor and focussing on intra-party politics, we assume that factions negotiate over party position according to the bargaining power of each subgroup. Furthermore, we assess how party organization affects this bargaining, showing that different internal rules might alter the equilibrium between factions and leaders.

Modelling party placement as the result of inter-factional competition, we will highlight how and under what circumstances factions affect the party, bounding the leader in the choice of the platform. In addition, our results will provide new insights about the linkage between party leaders, members, and activists. It will be shown that, overall, the leadership is strictly bound by party factions, particularly when the need to keep party unity is higher.

\* Tel.: +39 02 503 21220; fax: +39 02 503 21240.

E-mail address: [andrea.ceron@unimi.it](mailto:andrea.ceron@unimi.it).

However, intra-party rules seem to affect this outcome. After the crisis of the mass party model, parties faced a decrease in membership. In an attempt to arrest such decline the new model of party, the cartel (Katz, 1997, 2001; Katz and Mair, 1995; Mair, 1997), experiments with new internal rules that increase the level of intra-party democracy. These rules provide a direct link between members and the leadership (e.g., increasing the inclusiveness of the party leader's selectorate: Kenig, unpublished). As many authors suggest, however, a direct link between leaders and the rank-and-file might result in a greater autonomy of the former in the face of activists and factions (Katz, 2001; Mair, 1994; Marsh, 1993). Weakening the ability of factions to bind the leadership, these changes in party structure and organization revive the debate over Michels' (1915) iron law of oligarchy. Intra-party direct democracy emerges as a way to defang minority factions (that usually retain more radical ideological positions), empowering the elite's attempt to build vote-maximizing party platforms, detached from factional preferences.

The present work compares the ideal points of factions with the overall party position, focussing on the Italian case, which is a suitable and theoretically promising context in which to study the impact of factions on intra-party equilibriums. Italy is in fact universally identified as a benchmark of 'the politics of faction' (Ceron, 2011; Zuckerman, 1979), and a large number of articles have investigated the impact of Italian factions on topics like portfolio allocation (Mershon, 2001) or the voting behaviour of members of parliament (Giannetti and Laver, 2009).

Moreover, we can take advantage of two recently built datasets that draw the policy positions of Italian political actors (i.e., parties and factions) from 1946 to 2010, measured by applying techniques of content analysis to the wide textual documentation existing on Italian political debates. The first dataset provides information about the positions of Italian parties, almost year by year, through the analysis of parliamentary speeches released during confidence votes (Curini and Ceron, forthcoming; Curini and Martelli, 2009). The second analyses motions presented during party congresses, overcoming a lack of data about factions.

Our results indicate that, overall, factions bargain over party platform following a kind of Gamson (1961) rule, such that party position will be closely related to the weighted mean of the factions' positions. Factions then affect the party proportionally to their strength (i.e., the share of votes gained during party congress). This pattern is enhanced when new general elections approach, as party unity, fostered by consensual bargaining, provides higher electoral payoffs (McGann, 2002; Snyder and Ting, 2002). On the contrary, when intra-party rules strengthen the leadership's autonomy and legitimacy in the face of organized activists (factions), the party leader is more free to express a moderate platform, according to its wishes (i.e., maximizing party votes or the likelihood of being in office).

In the second section we summarize the literature on party position-taking, comparing alternative arguments that will be analysed later. In the third section we describe the datasets employed to test our claims, showing also some measures of validity. In the fourth and fifth sections

we discuss the results of our analysis and draw a conclusion.

## 2. Who sets the party position: literature and hypotheses

The literature on party position-taking is vast, and it focuses mainly on two aspects. One analyses the interactive movement of actors involved in party competition to find the existence of equilibrium. Downs' (1957) spatial theory shows that in a two-party system such equilibrium consists in a centripetal convergence of actors towards the median voter. This result, however, relies upon lots of assumptions about the motivations and individual features of political actors. Starting from this conclusion, scholars have tried to relax those assumptions. New models account for some aspects of 'real world politics', providing more realistic results that better fit the empirical evidence. Among these models we focus on those concerning multiparty systems, given that our claims will be analysed with respect to the Italian case. For instance, the 'unified theory of party competition' (Adams et al., 2005) provides some arguments to support the idea of centrifugal equilibrium. According to this model parties are pushed away from the centre, in the direction of those voters who feel identified with them. Although parties maintain a link with their partisans' preferences, this model predicts that parties maximize votes, adopting a slightly moderate position with respect to their followers.<sup>1</sup>

The other branch of the literature looks at the process of position-taking, not as the product of exogenous strategic interactions between parties in the system but as the endogenous result of an inward competition within the party (Budge et al., 2010; Levy, 2004). Starting from the idea that parties are somehow bounded by intra-party structure, scholars investigate the effect of organization and internal rules, on one side, and divergent intra-party preferences, on the other. Both elements affect party position and its changes across time. The present work is more centred on this second branch of studies, but will provide results and findings that take both into account. In particular, we will discuss alternative arguments that concern factional preferences, intra-party organization, and the pressure for a (partial) convergence due to party competition.

Parties are clearly not unitary actors (e.g., Ceron, 2011; Laver and Benoit, 2003; Laver and Schofield, 1990). Recently many works have started to relax this assumption to investigate the role played by members and factions in shaping the party (Giannetti and Benoit, 2009; Harmel and Tan, 2003). Factionalism influences the likelihood of gaining access to cabinet spoils, and factions shape the distribution of these office payoffs (e.g., Bäck, 2009; Mershon, 2001). Besides their interest in office, factions, like any other political actor (Müller and Strøm, 1999), are interested at least in part in policy payoffs. In fact, it has been

<sup>1</sup> Other models predict similar results; see Budge et al. (2010) for a review.

shown that policy preferences tend to structure factional membership (Bernauer and Bräuninger, 2009; Giannetti and Laver, 2009) so that, despite some common traits shared by all party members (Krehbiel, 1993; Snyder and Ting, 2002), the policy positions of internal factions are not exactly the same. Our dataset will help to map their divergent preferences to analyse how this impacts the process of position-taking.

It has been argued that the party's ideal point depends on how the internal organizational structure aggregates the preferences of members. Among divided parties the internal equilibrium is the result of a factional strife (Giannetti and Mulé, 2006: 462; Levy, 2004). Factions bargain to influence party strategy according to their power (Laver and Shepsle, 1990: 504). Depending on the party decision-making process, this strife might follow different paths leading to different potential outcomes (new party platforms). The decision-making process in turn is affected by intra-party rules and organization, and by the model of party that we take into account.

We might hypothesize that parties are (wholly or partially) bound by their factions, or alternatively, they are absolutely free to set their platform. In the first case party position should lie somewhere inside the Pareto set of factions' positions. According to Levy (2004: 251), 'parties can offer to voters any policy in the Pareto set of their members. Parties cannot commit to offer any policy outside the Pareto set but the party members can find mechanisms (such as bargaining) that allow them to choose policies within the Pareto set' (then this agreement will be enforceable). A stable agreement can be reached only inside the Pareto set.<sup>2</sup> If this is the case, any point inside this range should be related with the actual party position. However, the actual location of the party along the continuum depends on the bargaining power of each faction. This varies according to the size of factions, measured as the share of votes gained during the congress (or the share of seats inside party body). As Budge et al. (2010: 793) point out, 'The stronger one faction is relative to the others the more it overcomes resistance and carries its preferred policy further'. Among the points inside the Pareto set, two carry a theoretically substantial meaning that depends on the structure of intra-party dynamics. For the sake of preserving unity, inter-factional competition may build a consensual environment where all faction preferences are somehow taken into account (Budge et al., 2010; Giannetti and Laver, 2009). At the level of legislative party group Heller and Merzhon (2009) hypothesized that the party ideal point should be close to the average ideal point of legislative members. Extending this idea to party body, we observe that 'Indeed the mechanisms in which Western European parties reach internal compromise do mimic some form of a weighted average of the ideal policies of their factions' (Levy, 2004: 251). Hence, we would expect that intra-party policy payoffs (i.e., party position) would be distributed following a kind of Gamson (1961) rule, setting party platform with

a strong degree of proportionality.<sup>3</sup> Factions should be able to affect the party according to their reciprocal strength in party body (due to the results of party congress/convention). If this is true we would expect that party position would be closely related to the *Gamsonian agreement*: the mean of factions' positions weighted by the size of each faction. Such equilibrium would be the best predictor of party position and would bound the leader in the choice of platform and strategy (note that the strong emphasis on the link between party body and party strategy is coherent with the concept of *mass party*).

It has been argued that when the electoral system provides incentives for inter-factional competition, the common interests in partisan unity are insufficient to prevent internal dissension so that factions divide during the electoral campaign (Morgenstern, 2001). On the contrary, we claim that parties, to keep their unity, cater to all factions according to the latter's share of votes in the congress body. We stress the importance of party unity, which is a key source of party strength, particularly in the electoral arena (McGann, 2002; Snyder and Ting, 2002). Accordingly the importance of party unity should increase as general elections approach. Indeed scholars have stated that party manifestos take into consideration the concerns of both mainstream and minority factions precisely to boost party unity (and credibility) before elections (e.g., Levy, 2004). If this is the case, we should observe a tighter link between party position and the *Gamsonian agreement* as the legislative term comes to an end.

Alternatively, inter-factional conflict may assume the traits of a winner-take-all competition, with the median faction (mainstream) free to set its ideal point as the overall party position. Although occasionally the median faction could suddenly change party platform for strategic or contingent reasons, we expect that on average the party would be located inside the Pareto set, closer to the mainstream's ideal point. This is true for several reasons: the median faction still has a commitment with party members, due to the result of the party congress; strong deviations of its position from the ideological position of the bulk of party members could result in a loss of internal consensus (for the mainstream) and in a change of the dominant faction in the following party congress; minority factions could feel dissatisfied if the party is ruled only according to the will of the mainstream, and hence could exploit their bargaining power by threatening to defect and to leave the party.<sup>4</sup> Finally, as far as we deal with a unidimensional policy space, the median voter theorem applies, and the median faction's position emerges as the

<sup>2</sup> Moreover, both voters and rival parties believe that only positions inside the Pareto set can be stable.

<sup>3</sup> As is well known, the Gamson (1961) hypothesis is essentially a proportionality rule stating that cabinet portfolios are allocated to each party proportionally to their contribution to the ruling coalition (i.e., their share of seats). Warwick (2001) extended this reasoning to policy payoffs, showing that 'coalition policy corresponds with the weighted mean position of the parties in government, with the parties' seat share constituting the weights' (Warwick, 2001: 1215).

<sup>4</sup> Their bargaining power would be higher if the threat is credible and could harm the party (resulting in a loss of votes, seats, or strategic position).

party position. Compared with the Gamsonian argument, we just want to check whether party position is pushed away from such equilibrium in the direction of the median faction.

In line with this idea, we will measure the influence of the median faction above and beyond its contribution to the *Gamsonian agreement* through a variable that records the deviation of the median faction from the weighted mean.<sup>5</sup> This expectation would be confirmed if we find a positive significant value of the coefficient of such variable.

A third possible pattern assumes that parties are mildly bound by factions. The increasing personalization of politics in modern democracies (Poguntke and Webb, 2005) boosts the party leaders' power in spite of the strength of factions. Whether the party leader, due to her charisma or her 'dominant position' within the party, is able to set the new platform, we would expect a deviation from the factional agreement in the direction of her interests. However, party leaders are democratically elected; hence, the rank-and-file retain an influence over party position (Heller and Merzhon, 2009). The leader's first purpose is to remain in charge. In addition, as the agent delegated by party members, she will have more discretion in setting party position, and she will exploit this feature provided she can keep the members' approval.

When dealing with party leadership, however, we have to take into account different intra-party rules and organizational patterns that affect internal dynamics, providing the leader with greater or less power. This in turn affects the leadership's ability to deviate from the inter-factional agreement in the direction of its preferred party position. According to the cartel party model (Katz and Mair, 1995), leaders want more autonomy from activists' factions in order to be free to pursue the building of a cross-party cartel (Katz, 2001; Mair, 1997). The leader's purpose is to lower members' stakes, pushing the party to a moderate position and thereby increasing both party votes and the likelihood of being involved in government coalitions (Mair, 1994; Marsh, 1993). One strategy to enhance the leader's autonomy is to empower ordinary party members (or supporters), thus increasing the nominal level of intra-party democracy. Recent trends attest to an increase in the inclusiveness of party leader selection mechanisms, and these trends are particularly evident among Italian parties. Historically based on a small committee (National Council or Central Committee), the selection procedure has been extended to the whole audience of delegates at party congress, and, recently, the selectorate has tended to include all party members (and sometimes even unregistered supporters) through direct election of the leader (by means of closed or open 'primaries'). Italian mass parties started to enlarge the selectorate at the end of the 1970s. In 1976 the election of the DC leader was demanded of congress delegates instead of members of the National Council; the PSI set the

same rule in 1981, strengthening Craxi's personalized leadership.<sup>6</sup> Noticeably, the expanded inclusiveness of the leader's selectorate does not necessarily increase the rank-and-file's control over the leadership but paradoxically can be a leader's strategy to defang the base (Katz, 2001; Mair, 1994, 1997; Marsh, 1993; Poguntke and Webb, 2005; Rahat et al., 2008). Inclusiveness produces less tight contests and a decrease in competitiveness (Kenig, 2008), complicating the task of removing an unwanted leader.<sup>7</sup> In addition, a directly elected party leader retains a higher legitimacy; thus, she can cut out middle-level activists, getting rid of party factions' ties. As long as the leader's power increases, the party should be less bound by factions: the *Gamsonian agreement* would be less useful to predict party position, which instead would converge towards the centre of the policy space (in line with the idea suggested by the *cartel party* theory).

Finally, if parties behave as *catch-all* actors (Kirchheimer, 1966) they will appeal to a broader public, seeking the support of groups that lie outside the traditional party organization. As a consequence the impact of factional constraints should decline so that party position would be independent from the *Gamsonian agreement*. If this argument holds we would expect party positions to converge towards the centre, thereby maximizing votes and resources, regardless of the shape of intra-party preferences or the effect of party rules.

The alternative expectations discussed so far represent roughly three different models of party: *mass*, *cartel*, and *catch-all*. Each expresses a fulfilment or a response to the others (see Katz, 2001). We will compare them to assess under what condition each one prevails. We want to assess whether parties are bound by internal factions (likewise in a mass party) or are instead free to move (as suggested by the catch-all model). The third option lies somewhere in the middle: the rise of the cartel party is in fact conditional on changes in party rules and leads to different outputs depending on the shape of the intra-party environment.<sup>8</sup> The next section will present the datasets employed in the analysis.

### 3. The database related to the Italian case

Several authors have pointed out the importance of collecting data about the preferences of factions (see Budge et al., 2010; Giannetti and Benoit, 2009), but finding information about them is often a difficult task. So far only a few works have managed to measure factional preferences (Debus and Bräuninger, 2009; Giannetti and Laver, 2009; Spirling and Quinn, 2010), but

<sup>5</sup> This makes it possible to overcome any possible problem of correlation between the median and the *Gamsonian agreement*. Indeed these two positions are highly correlated (.987). See Warwick (2001: 1223) for an analogous argument.

<sup>6</sup> See Fabbrini (1994) and Calise (2005) on the link between leaders' personalized power and their direct election by party delegates. Moreover, Merzhon (2001) shows the impact of such rule on portfolio allocation among DC factions: after direct election, ministerial payoffs were no longer shared proportionally by all party subgroups.

<sup>7</sup> With regard to candidate selection, inclusiveness also produces lower levels of representation (Rahat et al., 2008).

<sup>8</sup> Contrary to the mass and the catch-all models, the cartel party 'whether understood as a synthesis/thesis in a dialectic process or as the next stage in a cyclical process [...] does not represent a steady state' (Katz, 2001: 282).

**Table 1**

List of parties, number of congresses and motions included in the analysis.

Party	Label	Total N° of congresses held	Congresses included in dataset	Missing congresses (estimated) <sup>a</sup>	N° of motions	Motions per congress
AN	National Alliance	3	1	0	4	4
DC	Christian Democratic	18	11	1	41	3.73
DS	Democrats of the Left	4	4	0	12	3
FV	Greens' Federation	18	2	7 <sup>b</sup>	6	3
MSI	Italian Social Movement	17	5	4	20	4
NPSI	New Italian Socialist Party	6	2	0	4	2
PCI	Italian Communist Party	16	3	0	8	2.67
PD	Democratic Party	3	1	0	3	3
PDA	Action Party	3	1	1	3	3
PDCI	Italian Communists' Party	5	1	0	2	2
PLI	Italian Liberal Party	19	11	1	35	3.18
PRC	Communist Party – Refounding	7	6	0	20	3.33
PRI	Italian Republican Party	22	11	8	25	2.27
PS	Socialist Party	2	1	0	3	3
PSDI	Italian Socialist	20	9	11	25	2.77
	Democratic Party					
PSI	Italian Socialist Party	24	12	0	38	3.17
PSIUP	Italian Socialist Party of	4	1	0	3	3
	Proletarian Unity					
UDC	Union of Centre and	3	1	0	2	2
	Christian Democratic					
<b>Total</b>		<b>194</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>254</b>	<b>3.06</b>

<sup>a</sup> This column refers to the number of contested (or presumably contested) congresses, where more than one faction presented motions, for which we were not able to find data.

<sup>b</sup> The Greens hold a National Assembly approximately once a year.

they do so only for a single party or for a limited period of time. This paper tries to fill the gap by providing a new dataset that contains information about the policy positions of factions among Italian parties from 1946 to 2010. Exploiting the large documentation available about Italian party congresses, this dataset presents a first attempt to systematically gather data on party factions and intra-party struggles.<sup>9</sup>

Although some authors have shown that it is possible to estimate factional preferences through roll call votes (e.g., *Spirling and Quinn, 2010*), it has also been argued that 'content analysis on texts drafted by [...] intra-party groups seems to be the best choice to identify their respective preferences, in particular if the research question deals with changes of the positions of political actors over time' (*Benoit et al., 2009a: 443*). Hence, this second option seems more suitable given the broad temporal extent of the present analysis. Text analysis also allows a better distinction between the variety of preferences that may lead to a similar voting behaviour. Furthermore, in a congress motion each faction is (almost) completely free to present its view about the party platform given that, during internal debates, party discipline should play

only a limited role in bounding the sincere expression of the factions' preferences (at least when compared with the stronger effect exerted on roll call votes in the parliamentary arena).<sup>10</sup>

To analyse factional preferences we gathered motions presented by factions during party congresses, and we analysed them through a technique of quantitative text analysis.<sup>11</sup> The party congress is an assembly of delegates elected by party members. It is the arena where 'factions organize teams of candidates and appeal to people enjoying the right to vote for one team or another' (*Mershon, 2001: 561*). Factions usually compete for members' votes, presenting a policy motion attached to a list of candidates. The congress motion is an omnibus policy document that aims to shape party strategy and ideology; it sets out the factions' 'opposing views on the ideological direction of the party' (*Giannetti and Laver, 2009: 154*). After a public debate, party congress delegates vote on the policy principals and establish the new party line that the leadership should pursue (*Levy, 2004*). Delegates elect the party body (a committee in charge of running the party until the next congress) and, directly or indirectly, the party leader. In that sense, party congresses provide 'hard data' about the party's factional structure

<sup>9</sup> Unfortunately, after the collapse of the Italian First Republic almost all the existing parties disappeared from the political arena (and their archives disappeared as well). Hence, the task of finding data is now even more complicated. Although there are some missing cases, our dataset contains information covering approximately 50% of the whole population of contested congresses (i.e., those where factions competed, presenting alternative motions).

<sup>10</sup> Note also that data about roll call votes cast in the Italian parliament are available only since 1988, after the removal of the secret ballot. Therefore, they do not cover the whole time span of our analysis.

<sup>11</sup> Many authors suggest analysing intra-party politics with a focus on party congress (e.g., *Boucek, 2009; Giannetti and Benoit, 2009; Mershon, 2001*).



(Giannetti and Laver, 2009), helping us determine the number and strength of each faction (Boucek, 2009), as well as their policy positions.

Overall we gathered 254 motions related to 83 congresses of 18 parties.<sup>12</sup> Table 1 shows some details.

To assess the preferences of factions, these motions were analysed through Wordfish (Proksch and Slapin, 2009a; Slapin and Proksch, 2008), a quantitative technique of text analysis.<sup>13</sup>

Wordfish is an automated scaling model developed to run with the statistical software R. It analyses textual documents, comparing the frequencies of words contained in each text, under the assumption that, for each document, the words' relative frequencies are informative of the policy position of that text.<sup>14</sup> Then it arrays documents along a single latent dimension, providing estimates of their positions on the scale. This latent dimension catches the political meaning of texts submitted to the analysis; it has to be interpreted ex-post according to the content of documents analysed. For instance, if all documents refer to a particular policy dimension (i.e., environmental policy) the software will scale them along the environmental dimension. Our unit of analysis is the document (motion) presented during party congress by each actor (faction). As far as motions are comprehensive omnibus policy documents that map out the overall ideological orientation of the party (Giannetti and Laver, 2009: 153), the actors' estimated positions will be arrayed along a dimension that should be interpreted as a left–right scale (see later). The main advantage of Wordfish is its ability to track variations in actors' preferences across time by estimating the position of actor  $i$  at time  $t$ , regardless of its position at time  $t - 1$ . As a consequence, the position of actor  $i$  will be stable only when the actor keeps using the same language across time. On the contrary, any shift in the position of actor  $i$  is due to a change in the set of words used by that actor and expresses an actual modification of its policy preferences, which is not an artefact of the model.

Therefore, Wordfish makes it possible to produce valid time-series estimates, though only if, overall, the word usage and the political language remain relatively constant over time (Proksch and Slapin, 2009a). Given the wide time extension of our analysis, we want to make sure that our results are not biased by changes in the actual meaning of some political words. For this reason we split

our data, analysing motions in two separate time periods.<sup>15</sup> We choose 1989 as the dividing line, assuming that political language changed after the collapse of communism.<sup>16</sup> Wordfish analyses documents providing two main parameters of interest:  $\omega$  and  $\beta$ . The former,  $\omega$ , expresses the (normalized) factions' position on the left–right scale. The latter,  $\beta$ , is the discrimination parameter and corresponds to the word's placement along the policy scale. For each word a higher absolute value of  $\beta$  indicates that the word is located on the extremes of the left–right scale and is more informative to discriminate among documents. Overall,  $\beta$  values of words that appear only in a few documents will be greater. On the contrary, words that appear frequently in all documents have a discriminating power close to zero and will be placed at the centre of the scale. Values of  $\beta$  are useful to carry a first diagnostic of the estimates. Fig. 1 displays the words'  $\beta$  parameters. We also highlight some words as examples, providing the English translation and distinguishing between the first (black) and the second (grey) time period (given that we ran two separate analyses). We can compare the words' placement on the left–right scale with their substantial meaning in Italian political language to make sure that the analysis catches the actual meaning of those words.

In the first period we find on the right side words like *god*, *motherland*, and *family*, which are traditionally associated with conservative values, while on the left we have *class*, *solidarity*, and *nationalization*. In the second period *no-global*, *collective bargaining*, and *peace* stand on the left, while *meritocratic*, *soldiers*, and *devolution* are recognized to be right-wing words and are in fact more used by right-wing parties, thereby allowing their detection. On both sides of the scale we find words that refer to different issues (e.g., economic, social, and foreign policies). For instance, concerns about *redistribution*, *laity*, and *disarmament* are attributed to left-wing parties, while on the right side the focus is on *privatization*, *birth-rate*, and *crime*. These examples confirm that  $\beta$  values assigned to words are coherent with their actual meaning in the Italian political language; hence, words appear on the proper side of the left–right scale.

<sup>12</sup> This dataset is unbalanced because we have a lot of data about some parties and only few related to others (there are 38 motions nested in 12 congresses, with respect to PSI, but only two motions presented in the unique contested congresses held by PDCI and UDC). However, this does not affect the analysis (see Section 4).

<sup>13</sup> Wordfish has been already employed to study the policy positions of political actors within Germany, Italy and the European Union, providing reliable estimates of actors' positions (Ceron, 2011; Klüver, 2009; Proksch and Slapin, 2009b, 2010).

<sup>14</sup> The main assumption of this technique is that words are distributed according to a Poisson distribution. This is false in the real world, but this model performs correctly to estimate positions, and its results are robust to this assumption. Wordfish estimates are also robust to text selection and reliable to other techniques of content analysis (Klüver, 2009; Slapin and Proksch, 2008).

<sup>15</sup> Dividing the dataset might create some trouble because it reduces the number of documents and the number of words helpful to discriminate among documents. The problem involves, in particular, right-wing parties, whose number of documents is lower compared with centre-left actors. For this reason we include in the dataset few non-factional texts (e.g., party manifestos) related to centre-right parties. Had we excluded these additional documents, the estimates would have been very similar.

<sup>16</sup> The fall of the Berlin Wall was one of the elements that altered the Italian party system during the 1990s (e.g., Bull and Rhodes, 1997), in particular with respect to the renewal of the Italian Communist Party (Giannetti and Mulé, 2006). The estimates of factions' positions are positively correlated (.68) with those obtained when running the analysis on the whole dataset, without imposing any dividing line. However, the policy positions of some actors seem more valid when we split the data (this is true mainly for factions belonging to the PCI, as we expected given the changes in the political language). Note that our estimates are also positively correlated (.66) with those obtained by adding an additional dividing line (set at 1968) and splitting the dataset into three subsets that retain a very similar temporal length (i.e., 1946–1968, 1969–1988, 1989–2010).




Fig. 1. Word beta coefficient (Left–Right scale) and fixed effect. First (black) and second period (grey).

Finally, we provide other measures to assess the validity of the factions' estimates. For each congress we compared the ordinal array of factions along the scale and found our estimates to be significantly correlated (.68) with the expected ordinal positions derived from the literature (e.g., Giannetti and Laver, 2009; Mershon, 2001) or newspapers reports. Within each party the wings are always located in a proper way.<sup>17</sup> Additionally, the estimates of factions are also able to catch the evolution of parties; they match the key changes occurring in party position across time, coherently with the main findings of the literature on Italian parties.<sup>18</sup> For all these reasons we contend that our estimates provide a valid measure of the factions' positions.<sup>19</sup>

To check the expectations discussed in Section 2 we want to compare the factions' preferences with the parties' ideal points. This confrontation is made possible thanks to a recently built dataset, the Italian Legislative Speeches dataset (ILS), which provides information about the party positions of Italian parties from 1946 to 2010 (Curini, 2011; Curini and Ceron, forthcoming; Curini and Martelli, 2009, 2010). These data are based on a codification of all the

investiture debates of the Italian governments.<sup>20</sup> Compared with Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data, ILS retains some advantages. First of all, CMP does not distinguish between positions of parties that run together in the election as a cartel but split afterwards; second, it does not assess the positions of new parties that form during the legislative term (i.e., due to party fission); finally, CMP provides only one value per legislature, where ILS, given the high level of instability in Italian governments, tracks the parties' positions almost year by year, increasing the number of cases included in our analysis. In fact, we can compare the positions of factions with the first known value of party position expressed after the congress (that for the same reasons discussed before is temporally connected to the congress). Furthermore, thanks to ILS, we can compare the factional equilibrium reached during congress at time  $t$  with all the values of policy positions held by the party until the new congress at time  $t + 1$ . This allows us to model changes in intra-party dynamics and bargaining over time; for instance, we can model the effect

<sup>17</sup> This is true also when considering the uncertainty around the estimates. When looking at confidence intervals we observe that the wings tend to retain positions that are statistically different from that of party mainstream. Data available upon request.

<sup>18</sup> Our data caught the moderate shift of PSI factions in line with changes in PSI policy position started in the 1960s (Curini and Martelli, 2009). The same holds for the movement towards the centre made by the heirs of PCI (Giannetti and Mulé, 2006). See also Ceron (2011).

<sup>19</sup> In 84% of cases (70 of 83 congresses) we found at least two factions whose positions are statistically different from each other. Excluding congresses where factions did not retain divergent positions does not affect the substantive results of our analysis.

<sup>20</sup> For each debate, the authors selected and codified the speech released by the party leader (or by a relevant representative) plus the Prime Minister's programmatic speech. The method adopted to codify speeches was similar to that employed by the well-known CMP to analyse the contents of party electoral programs (see Budge et al., 2001; for a detailed description). In each legislative speech the authors identified the number of quasi-sentences and assigned each of them to a number of pre-established categories that form the classification scheme. To take account of the Italian political context the original 56 categories of the CMP dataset were increased to 68. The dataset contains the percentage of the total text of legislative speech that deals with these categories. The dataset was constantly updated until December 2010 and includes information about a few additional debates over crucial votes of confidence (i.e., the debate related to Prodi I vote of no-confidence and two debates faced in 2010 by Berlusconi IV cabinet).

**Table 2**  
Hypotheses and operationalization.

Hypothesis and context	Variable	Operationalization	Expected effect
Dependent variable	Party position (PP)	Vanilla estimate of party position on CMD	(n.a.)
(1A) Mass party ruled by consensual dynamics	Gamsonian Agreement Position (GAP)	Mean of faction's position weighted by their share of seats in party body	(+) GAP affects PP (e.g. the more GAP stands on the right the more the party should be)
(1B) Mass party ruled by consensual dynamics: proportionality increases as new elections approach	GAP-YBE (Years Before the next general Elections)	Interaction between the GAP and the number of years remaining before the next general elections	(–) GAP marginal effect on PP increases when the YBE decreases, and vice versa
(2) Mass party ruled by winner-take-all dynamics	Distance Median – GAP	Distance between the median faction's position and the GAP	(+) A positive coefficient highlights a deviation from GAP towards the median faction
(3) Cartel party	GAP+Directly Elected Leader	Interaction between the GAP and a dummy variable that assumes value 1 when party leader is elected directly by delegates (or through primaries) and 0 when elected by a small committee	(–/0) Among parties where the leader is elected by a wide electorate the marginal effect of GAP should be lower (or not significant at all)
	Parliamentary Centre Of Gravity	Mean of parties' positions weighted by their share of seats in Parliament (proxy for the centre of policy space)	(+) Among parties where the leader is elected by a wide electorate the policy centre should affect PP
(4) Catch-all party	Gamsonian Agreement Position (GAP)	Mean of faction's position weighted by their share of seats in party body	(0) GAP effect on PP should never be significant
	Parliamentary Centre Of Gravity	Mean of parties' positions weighted by their share of seats in Parliament (proxy for the centre of policy space)	(+) The centre of policy space should always affect PP

of party fissions (occurring not immediately after the congress) over party position, and we can assess whether bargaining dynamics vary as time passes.<sup>21</sup> Using ILS we estimated party positions following the 'vanilla method' (Gabel and Huber, 2000). We ran a factor analysis on the percentage of quasi-sentences, and we extracted the first component; the standardized values of party positions were located on the latent dimension that emerged from the analysis.<sup>22</sup> Vanilla estimates are strongly correlated with the traditional RILE scale measured on ILS and with the results of the vanilla method applied to CMP data.<sup>23</sup>

In the fourth section we will compare these two datasets. Despite differences, these data share some traits. Both

are related to Italy from 1946 to 2010 (although they have been divided into two time periods, before and after 1989, to estimate positions). Both are built through content analysis. Wordfish algorithm and factor analysis produce normalized estimates of positions extracted along a seemingly common latent dimension, making no aprioristic assumptions on the substantive policy content of such dimension.<sup>24</sup> The parties' and factions' positions are aligned along the left–right scale, and these data cover the entire length of the continuum.<sup>25</sup> They come, however, from two completely different sources: the factions' positions are extracted from debates that took place in party body, while the data about parties are related to speeches delivered in the legislative arena. This can be an advantage because the two measures are exogenous with respect to

<sup>21</sup> When one or more factions broke away from the party during the period between one congress and the next, we rearranged the result of factional agreement measuring the new balance of power among the remaining subgroups. We excluded those cases where, due to party fissions, there was only one faction left; however, had we included these data the main results would not have changed.


<sup>22</sup> Given that we divided motions in two time periods before running Wordfish, we did the same when dealing with factor analysis. We divided ILS in two subsamples and ran two separate analyses. The results of these two factor analyses are highly correlated (.87), with parties' positions as they emerge from the analysis run on the whole dataset.

<sup>23</sup> The results of the vanilla method are reliable: the correlation between vanilla estimates and the RILE scale measured on ILS is strong and significant ( $r = .85$ ). Overall estimates of parties' positions, determined by applying the vanilla method to ILS and CMP, are positively correlated (.57); among data included in our analysis this coefficient increases to .61. Although we use ILS to test our argument we assess the reliability of our findings through CMP data; this does not alter our main results.

<sup>24</sup> It could be argued that intra-party politics involves more than one dimension. We know, however, that parties function as logrollers reducing complex issues into a low-dimensional space (Levy, 2004; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). If parties reduce the complexity on a single dimensional space they need to compromise on that. In addition, both processes used to estimate positions (Wordfish and factor analysis) follow a similar logic that reduces many issues onto a single latent dimension.

<sup>25</sup> More precisely, according to factor analysis in the first period the two most extreme parties were the PSIUP and the MSI. In the factions' dataset we have documents about PSIUP factions' and about MSI, and they are on the extremes as well. Similarly, in the second period the two most radical parties were PRC and MSI-AN; indeed the dataset on factions contains information about subgroups belonging to these two parties and they are located on the wings. Hence, the left–right dimension is wholly covered by data. However, the range of the scales is different. Then we divided all the values for the length of each continuum.





Our dependent variable is *Party Position* (PP), estimated through the vanilla method applied to ILS. Right-wing parties retain positive values, while PP is negative for parties located on the extreme left of the scale. Here we describe the independent variables. *Gamsonian Agreement Position* (GAP) is the mean of the faction's position weighted by its share of seats in party body, measured within each party congress; positive values indicate that the faction's average is on the right and vice versa. The greater this value is, the greater PP should be (the more GAP is on the right, the more we expect PP to be there). *Years Before Elections* (YBE) is the number of years remaining before the next general elections. We analyse its interaction with GAP: as YBE shrinks, the marginal effect of

Fig. 2 provides a first visual analysis of our general claim. For each party congress we show the GAP value along with all the PP values measured before the next congress. We distinguished cases where the party leader was directly elected (grey) from parties that elected their leader in smoke-filled rooms (black). Accordingly, we plotted two

<sup>27</sup> We do not distinguish between leaders elected by delegates or through open/closed primaries because the latter context concerns only one congress (PD 2009). In addition, even when leaders are elected by delegates, party members often know which leader is attached to each factional motion they vote for.

**Table 3**

Results of the OLS regression.

OLS Regression. Dependent Variable: party position				
	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)
Constant	.025 (.018)	.023 (.017)	-.008 (.015)	.022 (.017)
Gamsonian Agreement Position	.392*** (.106)	.410*** (.128)	.678*** (.134)	.544*** (.092)
Distance Median – GAP	–	-.191 (.310)	-.131 (.293)	-.257 (.176)
Parliamentary Centre Of Gravity	–	-.223 (.324)	.002 (.346)	.306* (.155)
Directly Elected Leader	–	–	-.020 (.036)	-.014 (.031)
Interaction Gap*Directly Elected Leader	–	–	-.291** (.132)	-.282** (.109)
YBE	–	–	.019*** (.005)	.005 (.004)
Interaction Gap*YBE	–	–	-.072** (.025)	-.054*** (.020)
R <sup>2</sup>	.50	.51	.64	.54
N	65	65	65	172

Note: Clustered Standard errors in brackets. Significance (two tailed): \* .1; \*\* .05; \*\*\* .01.

dashed lines with the fitted value of the regression for the two contexts.

This first enquiry tells us that factions do matter: there is a positive relationship between GAP and PP, attesting that the parties' ideal point is not independent from the factions' preferences. However, we observe differences between parties whose leaders are stronger or weaker. The grey line is shallower than the black one, indicating that (everything else being equal) leaders who retain a direct legitimacy can profit from a larger autonomy and are able to get rid of the factions' influence (in fact, the slope of the grey line is not even statistically different from zero).

Now we investigate more in depth the contribution provided by our covariates to the dependent variable by testing several models. In model 1, our baseline model, we regress PP (taking the first known value after the congress) on the factional agreements (GAP). In model 2 we add, as control variables, *Distance Median – GAP* and *Parliamentary Centre of Gravity*. In model 3 we include two interactions: between GAP and *Directly Elected Leader* and between GAP and YBE. In the fourth model we replicate the third model, but increase the number of cases: we take all the values of PP recorded until the next congress. We test these models by means of an ordinary least squares regression. Given that our observations are nested within parties, they might not be independent. To assure unbiased results of our analysis we cluster observations by party, providing standard errors by cluster.<sup>28</sup> Table 3 reports the results.<sup>29</sup>

The GAP coefficient is always significant: factions exert an effect on their parties' placement, and this is confirmed after including some control variables. On the contrary, *Distance Median – GAP* is never significant; we did not register any disproportionate effect of the median faction. Within each party the median, like any other faction, affects the platform only to the extent of its strength in party body.

The political centre seems to have no effect. *Parliamentary Centre of Gravity* is not significant in models 2 and 3, whereas it appears to have an impact on party position only in model 4.<sup>30</sup> Both interactions are significant and retain the expected sign. In line with our expectations, a *Directly Elected Leader* decreases the effect of GAP on PP, and this effect is quite strong.<sup>31</sup> For instance, according to model 4, the impact of GAP ceased to be significant among parties that elect their leader through a wide selectorate.<sup>32</sup> Finally, when general elections come closer, inter-factional bargaining becomes more consensual, and indeed the impact of GAP on PP increases. However, we can better discuss the effect of these interactions by looking at Figs. 3 and 4 (based on model 4). They draw the marginal effect of GAP on PP as the new general elections approach.

When leaders are selected by party committees (Fig. 3) they are more bound by the will of factions; factional preferences increasingly shape party position as new elections approach. On the contrary, when intra-party rules grant more autonomy to the leader (Fig. 4) the effect of GAP on PP is no longer significant (the confidence interval of the marginal effect crosses the zero line), unless looming elections increase the need for party unity, pushing the leader to partially cater to the factions.

We turn now to interpret these results in the light of the different models of party. The present analysis does not support the thesis of parties conceived as catch-all actors: as long as GAP is always significant we reject the idea that party positions are independent from factional preferences. In line with the model of mass party, consensual dynamics, more than a winner-takes-all logic, seem to drive the internal life of parties. Accordingly, any disproportionate


<sup>28</sup> In model 4 we repeated observations within each congress. Therefore, we change the cluster variable providing standard errors by congress. Clustered standard errors are heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (Rogers, 1993).

<sup>29</sup> Given the uncertainty attached to the estimates of factions' positions we could revert to the 'simulation–extrapolation' procedure (SIMEX) suggested by Benoit et al. (2009b) to deal with measurement error. We run the analysis using the upper and lower bounds of Wordfish estimates to assess the true value of GAP. This procedure however does not alter our main conclusions.


<sup>30</sup> When adding to model 4 an interaction between this variable and *Directly Elected Leader* we found that this effect is significant only when the latter variable retains value 1.

<sup>31</sup> This effect is still significant even after controlling for the policy preferences of the party leader's faction. When the party is ruled by leaders not linked to the median faction we would expect less consensual dynamics, and indeed we observe a lower effect of GAP on PP. However, this effect is not always significant throughout the analyses. Note also that testing this argument does not alter the results here presented.

<sup>32</sup> The marginal effect of GAP on PP is equal to .406 (.061) and statistically significant at the 99% level when the *Directly Elected Leader* dummy equals 0, while this effect is no longer significant when leaders are autonomous: .124 (.093). Standard errors in brackets.



**Fig. 3.** Marginal impact (with the 95% c.i.) of Gamsonian Agreement Position (GAP) on Party Position as the new general elections approach, when leaders are indirectly elected.



**Fig. 4.** Marginal impact (with the 95% c.i.) of Gamsonian Agreement Position (GAP) on Party Position as the new general elections approach, when leaders are directly elected.

advantage retained by the median faction above and beyond its share of votes does not emerge. However, the extent of such link between factional preferences and party position is conditional upon the shape of intra-party rules and the features of the party system. On one hand, when new elections come closer, parties tend to set their platform with an increasing degree of proportionality.<sup>33</sup> On the

other hand, the degree of the leader's autonomy plays a role. Although factions exert constraints on their parties, we observed that when the internal organization promotes the leader's autonomy the party seems to be no longer bounded by activists and its leader retains more discretion in setting the platform. This evidence is coherent with the model of party suggested by the 'cartel party' theory.

Comparing these results with the literature on party competition, we found that in a multiparty system with parties tied by activists there is no convergence towards the centre, in accordance with recent theories. The political centre exerts an attraction only when party leaders are free enough from factional blackmail to be able to set party position on their own. This aspect, in turn, is in line with the cartel party theory and stresses the ability of

<sup>33</sup> This holds true regardless of the changes in the electoral rule. We do not find differences between open-list proportional representation, used until 1992, and mixed systems with closed-list proportional representation (afterwards). Even when factions compete for preference votes (like during the First Republic) the appeal of party unity as a resource for inter-party competition holds, and parties seek to foster internal cohesion when setting their position before the campaign.

autonomous leadership to partially adopt moderate stakes, moving the party towards more convenient positions. This further explains why, in current politics, strong leaders are able to increase party votes, building their electoral fortunes.

## 5. Conclusion

Going beyond the assumption of party as a unitary actor, this work investigated the process of position-taking within the party. Exploiting two recently built datasets that estimated the policy positions of Italian parties and factions from 1946 to 2010, the present analysis focused on how factions bound party leaders in choosing the platform. We compared contrasting theories that propose alternative models of party, trying to assess whether the party is run as an oligarchy whose leader is completely in control of party choices (as suggested by Michels, 1915) or, alternatively, the impact of factional preferences prevails.

Overall, we find confirmation for the idea that party positions are linked to the preferences of factions, discarding a model of catch-all parties completely free to move in the policy space. Due to the pressure exerted by factions, the party seems to work as a 'bounded oligarchy'. The impact of factional constraints is greater when general elections approach and the electoral payoff of party unity pushes the pursuit of a compromise among all party subgroups. In line with the cartel party theory, however, the autonomy of leaders increases when they are directly elected by a wider electorate, in spite of the factions' desires. They can exploit such autonomy to set a more vote-maximizing position, and we in fact registered a partial convergence towards the centre. Indeed, this work, although carried out in a non-strategic setting, finds confirmation for the most recent developments of Downsian theories that predict a centrifugal equilibrium with partial convergence. Finally, this paper shows that direct election of party leaders (e.g., through 'primaries') might defang the activists. Instead of promoting members' control of party elites and the emergence of a widely shared platform, intra-party democracy seems to support the leader's autonomy, making the party slip towards a 'Bonapartist' and oligarchic organization.

## References

- Adams, J., Merrill, S., Grofman, B., 2005. *A Unified Theory of Party Competition*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Aldrich, J., 1983. A Downsian spatial model with party activism. *American Political Science Review* 77, 974–990.
- Bäck, H., 2009. Intra-party politics and local government formation. In: Giannetti, D., Benoit, K. (Eds.), *Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Government*. Routledge, New York, pp. 53–68.
- Barnes, S.H., 1977. Representation in Italy. In: *Institutionalised Tradition and Electoral Choice*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London.
- Benoit, K., Bräuninger, T., Debus, M., 2009a. Challenges for estimating policy preferences: announcing an open access archive of political documents. *German Politics* 18 (3), 441–454.
- Benoit, K., Laver, M., Mikhaylov, S., 2009b. Treating words as data with error: uncertainty in text statements of policy positions. *American Journal of Political Science* 53, 495–513.
- Bernauer, J., Bräuninger, T., 2009. Intra-party preference heterogeneity and faction membership in the 15th German Bundestag: a computational text analysis of parliamentary speeches. *German Politics* 18 (3), 385–402.
- Boucek, F., 2009. Rethinking factionalism: typologies, intra-party dynamics and three faces of factionalism. *Party Politics* 15 (4), 455–485.
- Budge, I., Ezrow, L., McDonald, M.D., 2010. Ideology, party factionalism and policy change: an integrated dynamic theory. *British Journal of Political Science* 40, 781–804.
- Budge, I., Klingemann, H.-D., Volkens, A., Bara, J., Tanenbaum, E. (Eds.), 2001. *Mapping Policy Preferences*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Bull, M., Rhodes, M., 1997. *Crisis and Transition in Italian Politics*. Frank Class, London.
- Calise, M., 2005. Presidentialization, Italian style. In: Poguntke, T., Webb, P. (Eds.), *The Presidentialization of Politics: a Study in Comparative Politics*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 88–106.
- Ceron, A., 2011. Correnti e frazionismo nei partiti politici italiani (1946–2010): un'analisi quantitativa delle mozioni congressuali. *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica* 41 (2), 237–264.
- Curini, L., 2011. Government survival the Italian way: the core and the advantages of policy immobilism during the first republic. *European Journal of Political Research* 50, 110–142.
- Curini, L., Ceron, A. Parties' influence during government policy negotiations: parliamentary dynamics and spatial advantages in the First Italian Republic. *Journal of Legislative Studies*, forthcoming.
- Curini, L., Marangoni, F., Tronconi, F., 2011. Rebels with a cause – but which one? Defections from legislative party unity in Italy and their individual and institutional determinants. *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica* 41 (3), 385–409.
- Curini, L., Martelli, P., 2009. I partiti nella prima Repubblica. In: *Maggioranze e governi dalla Costituente a Tangentopoli*. Carocci, Roma.
- Curini, L., Martelli, P., 2010. Ideological proximity and valence competition. Negative campaigning through allegation of corruption in the Italian legislative arena from 1946 to 1994. *Electoral Studies* 16 (3), 299–321.
- Debus, M., Bräuninger, T., 2009. Intra-party factions and coalition bargaining. In: Giannetti, D., Benoit, K. (Eds.), *Intra-party Politics and Coalition Government*. Routledge, New York, pp. 121–145.
- Downs, A., 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. Harper, New York.
- Fabrizi, S., 1994. Personalization as Americanization? The rise and fall of leader-dominated governmental strategies in western Europe in the eighties. *American Studies International* 32, 51–65.
- Gabel, M., Huber, J., 2000. Putting parties in their place. *American Journal of Political Science* 44, 94–103.
- Gamson, W., 1961. A theory of coalition formation. *American Sociological Review* 26, 373–382.
- Giannetti, D., Benoit, K. (Eds.), 2009. *Intra-party Politics and Coalition Government*. Routledge, New York.
- Giannetti, D., Laver, M., 2009. Party cohesion, party discipline, party factions in Italy. In: Giannetti, D., Benoit, K. (Eds.), *Intra-party Politics and Coalition Government*. Routledge, New York, pp. 146–168.
- Giannetti, D., Mulé, R., 2006. The Democratici di Sinistra: in search of a new identity. *South European Society & Politics* 11 (3), 457–475.
- Grofman, B., 2004. Downs and two-party convergence. *Annual Review of Political Science* 7, 25–46.
- Heller, W.B., Mershon, C., 2009. Legislator preferences, party desire: the impact of party switching on legislative party position. In: Heller, W.B., Mershon, C. (Eds.), *Political Parties and Legislative Party Switching*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp. 173–200.
- Harmel, R., Tan, A., 2003. Party actors and party change: does factional dominance matter? *European Journal of Political Research* 42, 409–424.
- Katz, R.S., 1997. *Democracy and Elections*. Oxford University Press, New York.
- Katz, R.S., 2001. The problem of candidate selection and models of party democracy. *Party Politics* 7 (3), 277–296.
- Katz, R.S., Mair, P., 1995. Changing models of party organization and party democracy: the emergence of the cartel party. *Party Politics* 1, 5–28.
- Kenig, O., 2008. Democratization of party leadership selection: do wider selectorates produce more competitive contests? *Electoral Studies* 28, 240–247.
- Kenig, O. The Democratization of Party Leaders' Selection Methods: Canada in Comparative Perspective. Prepared for delivery at the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference 27–29 May 2009, University of Carleton, Ottawa, unpublished.
- Kirchheimer, O., 1966. The transformation of the western European party system. In: LaPalombara, J., Weiner, M. (Eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development*. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Klüver, H., 2009. Measuring interest group influence using quantitative text analysis. *European Union Politics* 10, 535–549.
- Krehbiel, K., 1993. Where's the party? *British Journal of Political Science* 23 (2), 235–266.
- Laver, M., Benoit, K., 2003. The evolution of party system between elections. *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (2), 215–233.

- Laver, M., Schofield, N., 1990. *Multiparty Government: the Politics of Coalition in Europe*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Laver, M., Shepsle, K.A., 1990. Government coalitions and intraparty politics. *British Journal of Political Science* 20 (4), 489–507.
- Levy, G., 2004. A model of political parties. *Journal of Economic Theory* 115, 250–277.
- Mair, P., 1994. Party organization: from civil society to the state. In: Katz, R.S., Mair, P. (Eds.), *How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*. Sage, London, pp. 1–22.
- Mair, P., 1997. *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations*. Oxford University Press, New York.
- Marsh, M., 1993. Introduction: selecting the party leader. *European Journal of Political Research* 24 (3), 229–231.
- McGann, A.J., 2002. The advantages of ideological cohesion: a model of constituency representation and electoral competition in multi-party democracies. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 14, 37–70.
- Mershon, C., 2001. Party faction and the coalition government: portfolio allocation in Italian Christian Democracy. *Electoral Studies* 20, 555–580.
- Michels, R., 1915. *Political Parties: a Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. Free Press, New York.
- Morgenstern, S., 2001. Organized factions and disorganized parties. Electoral incentives in Uruguay. *Party Politics* 2, 235–256.
- Müller, W.C., Strøm, K. (Eds.), 1999. *Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Choices*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Poguntke, T., Webb, P. (Eds.), 2005. *The Presidentialization of Politics: a Study in Comparative Politics*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Poole, K.T., Rosenthal, H., 1997. *Congress: a Political–economic History of Roll Call Voting*. Oxford University Press, New York.
- Proksch, S.O., Slapin, J.B., 2009a. WORDFISH: Scaling Software for Estimating Political Positions from Texts. Version 1.3 (22 January 2009). <http://www.wordfish.org>.
- Proksch, S.O., Slapin, J.B., 2009b. How to avoid pitfalls in statistical analysis of political texts: the case of Germany. *German Politics* 18 (3), 323–344.
- Proksch, S.O., Slapin, J.B., 2010. Position taking in European parliament speeches. *British Journal of Political Science* 40, 587–611.
- Rahat, G., Hazan, R.Y., Katz, R.S., 2008. Democracy and political parties. On the uneasy relationship between participation, competition and representation. *Party Politics* 14 (6), 663–683.
- Rogers, W.H., 1993. Regression standard errors in clustered samples. *Stata Technical Bulletin* 13, 19–23.
- Snyder, J.M., Ting, M.M., 2002. An informational rationale for political parties. *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (1), 90–110.
- Slapin, J.B., Proksch, S.-O., 2008. A scaling model for estimating time-series party positions from texts. *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (3), 705–722.
- Spirling, A., Quinn, K., 2010. Identifying intra-party voting blocs in UK House of Commons. *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 105, 490.
- Strøm, K., 1990. A behavioral theory of competitive political parties. *American Journal of Political Science* 34, 565–598.
- Ware, A., 1992. Activist–leader relations and the structure of political parties: ‘exchange’ models and vote-seeking behaviour in parties. *British Journal of Political Science* 22 (1), 71–92.
- Warwick, P.V., 2001. Coalition policy in parliamentary democracies: who gets how much and why. *Comparative Political Studies* 34, 1212–1236.
- Zuckerman, A.S., 1979. *The Politics of Faction: Christian Democratic Rule in Italy*. Yale University Press, New Haven.